On August 29, 2007, six AGM-129 ACM cruise missiles, each loaded with a W80-1 variable producing a nuclear warhead, were erroneously loaded onto the US Air Force B-52H heavy bomber at the Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota and transported to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana. The nuclear warheads on missiles should have been removed before the missiles were taken from their storage bunker. Missiles with nuclear warheads are not reported missing, and remain attached to planes in Minot and Barksdale for 36 hours. During this period, the warheads were not protected by any mandatory security precautions for nuclear weapons.
The incident was reported to the top level of the US military and was referred by observers as the Bent Spear incident, which shows "unexpected events involving nuclear weapons or nuclear components not included in the NUCFLASH or BROKEN ARROW" category or "nuclear incidents involving nuclear weapons/warheads or nuclear components.In the Army and the Air Force, this term includes 'significant incidents' as defined in DoD Directive 5100.52 ".
Responding to the incident, the US Department of Defense (USA) and USAF conducted an investigation, whose results were released on October 19, 2007. The investigation concluded that nuclear weapons treatment standards and procedures have not been followed by a number of USAF personnel. involved in the incident. As a result, four USAF commanders are exempt from their orders, a number of other USAF personnel are disciplined or declared to perform certain sensitive tasks, and continuing missile missile missions from - and nuclear weapons operations at - Minot Air Force Base is dependent. In addition, USAF issued new nuclear weapons instruction and procedures.
Separate investigations by the Council of Defense Science and the USAF "blue band" panel reported that concerns existed in procedures and processes for dealing with nuclear weapons within the Department of Defense but found no failure with US nuclear weapons security. Based on this and other incidents, on June 5, 2008, Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne and Air Force Chief of Staff General T. Michael Moseley were asked to resign, which they gave. In October 2008, in response to recommendations by the review committee, the USAF announced the creation of the Air Force's Global Air Force Command to control all USAF nuclear bombers, missiles and personnel.
Video 2007 United States Air Force nuclear weapons incident
​​â € <â €
In August 2007, Minot Air Force Base was the home of the Bomb Wing 5 (5 BW) and Barksdale Air Force Base was the home of the 2nd Bomb Wing (2 BW), both falling under the Air Force 8 (8 AF), also based in Barksdale. At that time, 5 BW, 2 BW, and 8 AF were all subordinate organizations of Air Combat Command (ACC).
Both wings bombs and 8 AF earlier, the unit of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) to the reorganization in 1992 of the command of the main Air Force (MAJCOMs) has resulted in the disestablishment of SAC and reassignment and joining forces bomb manned by former Tactical Air Command (TAC), which is mainly USAF fighter aircraft. The new organization was named Air Combat Command (ACC), though it retained both the TAC's organizational logo and TAC headquarters in Langley AFB, Virginia.
At the time of the incident, the 5th Wing Bomb was ordered by Colonel Bruce Emig, Bom 2 Wing by Colonel Robert Wheeler, 8th Air Force by Lieutenant General Robert Elder Jr., and ACC by General Ronald Keys.
The 5th Bomb Wing, according to a USAF statement on the wing mission, was presented with the B-52H bomber as part of USAF's conventional and strategic combat forces. The "strategic" part of the fifth mission includes the ability to deliver nuclear weapons to potential targets worldwide. Thus, Minot Air Force Base stores and maintains nuclear weapons, nuclear warheads and related delivery systems, including AGM-129 Advanced Cruise Missile.
The AGM-129 was fielded in 1987 as a stealthy cruise missile platform to provide variable W80-1 nuclear warheads. Although originally designed to complement the B-1B Lancer bomber, the AGM-129 was redesigned so that it will only be carried by the B-52H, mounted on an external pole on the wing or internally in the bomb bay. In March 2007, the USAF decided to stop the AGM-129 complement to help comply with international arms control agreements and replace them with AGM-86 missiles. To do so, USAF started transporting AGM-129 stored in Minot to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana by B-52s for final disposal. According to The Washington Post, on August 29, 2007, more than 200 AGM-129s have been shipped from Minot to Barksdale in this way.
Maps 2007 United States Air Force nuclear weapons incident
Incident
Between 0800 and 0900 (local time) on August 29, 2007, a group of USAF aviators, called the breakout crew, entered one of the weapons storage bunkers in Minot to prepare AGM-129 missiles for transport to Barksdale. The missile transport of the day, the sixteen of the 12 planned ferry missions, consisted of twelve AGM-129, mounted with training warheads, with six missiles per pylon and one pole mounted below each wing of Barkang B, 2 Bomb -52 aircraft. When the pilots entered the bunker, six warheads were still mounted on their missiles, as opposed to having been replaced with puppet training warheads. The investigation then found that the reason for the error was that the electronic production system to track missiles "had been subverted for the informal process of not identifying the pole as ready for flight." The pilots assigned to handle missiles use obsolete materials containing misinformation about missile status. Missiles originally planned for movement have been replaced by missiles closer to expiry dates for limited life components, which are standard procedures. Changes in missiles have been reflected in the movement plans but not in documents used for internal work coordination processes in bunkers.
Although the runaway crew in the armory started checking the missiles, a transport crewman who arrived at the beginning connected the pylons and pulled them off without checking or ensuring that the missiles had been inspected or cleaned for disposal. The ammunition control center failed to verify that the pole had received the proper clearance and inspection and approved the pylon to load on the B-52 at 0925. After taking eight hours to install the pylons, the aircraft with the missiles loaded then stayed parked overnight in Minot for 15 hours without a guard specifically required for nuclear weapons.
On the morning of August 30, one of the aircraft transport officers, a B-52 radar navigator assigned by Barksdale, examined six right-wing missiles carefully, all of which were loaded correctly with training warheads. The B-52 pilot commander did not perform a final verification check, before signing the cargo list manifest as a dozen AGM-129 unarmed missiles to leave Minot.
The B-52 departs Minot at 0840 and lands in Barksdale at 1123 (local time) on August 30th. The plane remains parked and unattended until 2030, when the ammunition team arrives to release the missile. After a member of the ammunition crew noticed something unusual about some missiles, in 2200 a "skeptical" supervisor determined that a nuclear warhead was present and ordered it secured and the incident was reported, 36 hours after the missiles were removed from the bunker in Minot..
The incident was reported to the National Military Command Center as the Bent Spear incident. General T. Michael Moseley, Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, quickly summoned US Defense Secretary Robert Gates on August 31 to inform him of the incident. Gates requested daily updates on the investigation and told President Bush about the incident. The USAF has not officially pointed out what kind of incident actually happened, Bent Spear or otherwise. The incident was the first in 40 years in the United States and later described by the media as "one of the worst offenses in US nuclear weapons security in decades".
Response by the U.S. government
The USAF and the Department of Defense initially decided to keep the incident a secret, partly because of the USAF's policy not to comment on the storage or movement of nuclear weapons and a clear belief that the incident would not generate much public interest. In fact, the initial DoD incident report contains a statement, "No anticipated press interest." The details of the incident were then leaked by an unidentified DoD officer to the Military Times newspaper, which published a small article about the incident on September 5, 2007.
In response, the September 5 news briefing at the Pentagon by Press Secretary Geoff Morrell stated that no public time was in danger and that military personnel had held the weapons at all times. The USAF announced that within days of the incident, USAF freed the squadron Minot Ammunition commander and ultimately disciplined 25 aviators. USAF Major General Doug Raaberg was commissioned by the General Keys to lead an investigation into the incident. The inventory of the USAF nuclear warheads is checked to ensure that all warheads are taken into account. In addition, the Department of Defense announced that a panel of scientific advisors appointed by the Pentagon, called the Council of Defense Sciences, would study the accident as part of a larger review of procedures to deal with nuclear weapons. On September 28, the USAF announced that the General Key retired and will be replaced as an ACC commander by General John Corley, effective Oct. 2.
On October 19, 2007, United States Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne and USAF Major General Richard Newton, deputy chief of staff for operations, plans and requirements, announced the findings of an investigative report, stating that "there has been erosion of compliance with standards of arms handling in the Base Force Air Minot and at Barksdale Air Force Base "and that" a small number of pilots in both locations failed to follow the procedure. "Colonel Emig, commander of 5 Wing Bomb, Colonel Cynthia Lundell, commander of the 5th Maintenance Group in Minot, and Colonel Todd Westhauser, commander Operation Group 2d Barksdale, and four non-commissioner senior officers from the 5th Armpot Squadron "received administrative measures" and were exempt from their orders or positions and transferred. All 5th Bomb Wing personnel are deprived of their certification to deal with nuclear weapons and other sensitive weaponry and to perform a "special mission". Sixty-five aviators of various ranks lost their Personnel Security Program certification. The tactical ferry operation was stopped. The inspectors general office of all USAF Major Commanders dealing with nuclear weapons is directed to conduct "Nuclear Inspection of Nuclear Control (LNSI)" directly in every nuclear unit "with the supervision provided by the Defense Threatening Agency.
The new ACC commander, General Corley, referred this matter to ASF Lieutenant General Norman Seip, the 12th Air Force commander, as a military authority conducting trials to determine whether additional allegations or measures would be taken against any of the personnel involved in the incident. Seip then closes the investigation without recommending criminal charges against anyone involved.
The retired USAF Chief of Staff, Gen. Larry Welch, was asked by Gates, who reportedly voiced concerns with USAF officials that preliminary investigations may have unfair mistakes against middle-ranking officials, to lead the advisory panel of the Council on Defense Sciences that will study the accident as part of a larger review of procedures and policies for dealing with nuclear weapons. In addition, USAF chartered a "blue ribbon" inspection led by USAF Major General Polly Peyer and consisted of 30 additional personnel to "make recommendations on how we can improve the Air Force's ability to safely and safely carry out our nuclear weapons responsibilities". Furthermore, the US Congress requested DoD and the US Department of Energy undertake a review of nuclear procedures.
Aftermath
USAF action
On October 24, 2007, Air Force Secretary Wynne told the House Armed Services Committee that he was convinced that the 5th Wing Bomb could be re-certified and could continue delivering AGM-129 cruise missiles to Barksdale for retirement. He did not provide a timeline for the re-certification process. On November 1, 2007, Colonel Joel Westa took command of the Bomb 5 Wing. On the same day, the General Key retires from the Air Force.
Personnel from 2 Bomb Wing Barksdale while taking over the maintenance of Minot nuclear supplies to 5 Bomb Wing can be re-certified. A nuclear inspection inspection (NSI), required for re-certification, was originally scheduled for the 5th Wing Bomb for January 23, 2008 postponed after the initial NSI failed wing that occurred on December 16, 2007. The other initial NSI was completed on March 29 and Corley re-certified wings on March 31, 2008. The full NSI is scheduled for May 2008. The Wing needs to regain certification to hold the full NSI. Units that handle nuclear weapons must pass NSI every 18 months to maintain their certification.
USAF issued a new policy directive on the handling of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, which prohibit the storage of armed and non-nuclear weapons in similar storage facilities. Further directives instructed that all non-nuclear munitions and missiles should be labeled with placards clearly stating that they were not armed with nuclear warheads. The wing commander is now accused of approving any movement of nuclear weapons from the weapons storage and should appoint an individual as an officer of the accountability system of ammunition and gunman. All units dealing with nuclear weapons should develop a coordinated visual inspection checklist. The policy further directs that pilots assigned to handle or maintain nuclear weapons can not serve more than 12 hours, except in an emergency, when their period of work can be extended to a maximum of 16 hours. The USAF has since instituted a surprise inspection program in armed forces bases.
Review report
Welch and Peyer read their reviews before the US Senate Committee on Armed Services on February 12, 2008. In addition to Welch and Peyer, Lieutenant General Daniel Darnell, USAF Deputy Chief of Staff for Air, Space and Information Operations, and Major General Raaberg testified and answering questions from members of the Senate committee. During the trial, Welch stated that "the military units responsible for handling bombs are not properly examined and, as a result, may not be ready to carry out their mission." He added, "If you look at all areas and all the ways we have to store and handle these weapons to do missions, it just needs, we believe, more resources and more attention than they get." The Welch report concludes that the merging of DoD nuclear power with non-nuclear organizations has led to "very reduced leadership levels whose daily focus is nuclear companies and general devaluation of nuclear missions and those on missions." However, neither Welch nor Peyer's report found no failure with US nuclear weapons security.
In response to Welch and Peyer's report, USAF officials stated that they had implemented many of the recommendations contained in the report but added that the existing regulations governing nuclear procedures were satisfactory. During his testimony before the senate committee, Darnell stated that "the Air Force part of the nuclear deterrent is healthy, and we will take every necessary step to provide safe, safe and reliable nuclear assurances to the American public."
Inspection, resignation, and further discipline
The full NSI Minot took place on May 17, 2008, and was conducted by inspectors from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and the USAF Air Combat Command (ACC). On May 25th, DTRA issued the 5th Wing Wing as an "unsatisfactory" rating, the lowest possible rating, from the examination. The five passed inspections in nine out of ten regions, but failed in the field of nuclear security. After the examination, Westa stated, "Overall, their assessment illustrates some of the things we need to do in the field of training and discipline." Commander of Squadron Force Guard I, Lieutenant Colonel John Worley, was replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Weaver on June 16, 2008. Despite the failure of the NSI, the wings continue to maintain their nuclear certification. Said Hans Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists about the fifth failure in the inspection, "It makes you wonder what's going on elsewhere, like nuclear weapons stationed at bases abroad, and at Barksdale Air Force Base and Whiteman Air Force Base. "Minot passed a follow-up examination on August 15, 2008.
On June 5, 2008, Robert Gates announced the results of an investigation of the shipment error in 2006 from four re-assembled Mk 12 vehicles to Taiwan. The investigation, conducted by Admiral Kirkland H. Donald, director of the US Naval Nuclear Propulsion, found that the Taiwan missile incident, in the words of Gates, "degrades authority, standards of excellence and technical competence in the strength of the nation's ICBM. in August 2007 Minot-Barksdale, this incident occurred in an environment greater than a decrease in the mission's focus and performance of the Air Force's mission "and that" the investigation identifies the similarity between the Minot incident in August 2007 and this [Taiwan event. "] In his investigative report, Donald stated that the problem identified by his investigation was "showing a complete decline in stewardship of Air Force nuclear weapons, a problem that has been identified but not handled effectively for more than a decade." The two Minot-Barksdale nuclear weapons incidents of displacement and omission of Taiwan, albeit differently, same origin: eros i staged nuclear standards and lack of effective oversight by the Air Force leadership. "
As a result of the investigation, Gates announced that "a large number of Air Force officers and colonels have been identified as potentially subject to disciplinary action, ranging from transfer from order to warning letter," and that he has accepted the resignation of the Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne and Chief of Staff USAF T. Michael Moseley. Gates added that he had asked James R. Schlesinger to lead a senior-level task force to recommend improvements in stewardship and operation of nuclear weapons, vehicle shipments and sensitive components by the Department of Defense. Members of the task force are from the Defense Policy Board and the Council on Defense Sciences.
On September 13, 2008, Gates announced the recommendation of the Schlesinger task force by asking the USAF to place all nuclear weapons under one command. The task force suggested that the new command was called the Air Force Strategic Command, which would replace the current Air Force Space Command, and make it responsible for nuclear missions. It also called for all USAF bombers to be placed under one command. In addition, the task force recommended that the USAF transfer an additional 1,500 to 2,000 pilots to nuclear-related work. Gates announced that acting Air Force Secretary Michael B. Donley and General Staff Chief Norton A. Schwartz were "reviewing recommendations" for disciplinary action against USAF officers previously involved in nuclear missions. The task force found "an unambiguous, dramatic and unacceptable decline in Air Force commitments to conduct nuclear missions and, until recently, little has been done to reverse them."
On September 25, 2008, the US Department of Defense announced that six Air Force generals, two army generals, and nine colonels had received warning, warning, or counseling letters. The two main Air Force generals are required to remain in their current position and the other either retire, plan to retire, or have been removed from their positions. Air Force Chief Norton Schwartz met with each officer personally before issuing the letters. He noted that they did not commit violations under UCMJ, but "not enough to carry out their leadership responsibilities for nuclear oversight" and "for that they must be held accountable." The Air Force declared that discipline was in response to sending wrong nuclear fuzes to Taiwan, not to Minot nuclear weapons incidents.
One that was reprimanded was Lt. Gen. Kevin Sullivan, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force for Logistics, Installation and Mission Support at the Pentagon. Sullivan was demoted and retired to the rank of major general in November 2008. Lieutenant General Michael Hamel, commander of Space and Missile Systems Center, received a letter of reprimand and also retired in November 2008. Major General Roger Burg, commander of the Air Force Twentieth, Major General Kathleen Close, commander of the Ogden Air Logistics Center, Brigadier General Francis Bruno, Director of Logistics, Air Force Command, and Brigadier General Arthur Cameron III, director of air force integration of resources, also received warning letters.
In November 2008, 341 Sengit Sengit at Malmstrom Air Force Base failed its nuclear security checks. The 90th Missile Wing at F. E. Warren Air Force Base failed its nuclear warranty inspection one month later. In November 2009 at Kirtland Air Force Base, Air Force 377, commanded by Colonel Michael S. Duvall, and 498 Nuclear Systems Wing, ordered by Colonel Richard M. Stuckey, failed in inspection of his nuclear warranty.
On October 30, 2009, Westa was relieved to be the commander of the 5th Wing Bomb by Major General Floyd L. Carpenter, commander of the 8th Air Force under the philosophy of "perfection is standard" which was later discredited. Carpenter stated that Westa was relieved because of his "inability to develop a culture of excellence, a lack of focus on strategic missions and sub-standard performance during several nuclear inspection assurances, including the newly activated 69th Bomb Squadron." Furthermore, the shooting set was used to divert attention from institutional, organizational and leadership failures in both the Air Force and the Air Combat Command.
On January 8, 2009, the Schlesinger task force released its report on the overall Department of Defense's management of the country's nuclear weapons mission. The report criticized the Department of Defense for its lack of focus and oversight of its nuclear weapons program and recommended that the Department of Defense create a new assistant secretary position to oversee its nuclear management. The task force found that within the Department of Defense only the US Navy effectively manages nuclear weapons. The panel stated that they found "a sad level of disinterest over the role of nuclear weapons in prevention among many senior DoD military and civilian leaders."
New command
Source of the article : Wikipedia
0 Comments